
THE DUAL ALLIANCE 

vs. 

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 



GERMANY'S CASE 



IN THE 



SUPREME COURT 
OF CIVILIZATION 



DR. KARL HELFFERICH, GERMAN 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
REVIEWS THE "WHITE," "YELLOW," 
AND "ORANGE" PAPERS, AND 
REACHES A DIFFERENT CONCLU- 
SION FROM THAT OF JAMES M. 
BECK, HOLDING THE ALLIES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR 




THE FATHERLAND CORPORATION 

1123 BROADWAY 

NEW YORK 



The Dual Alliance 
The Triple Entente 



Germany's Case in the 

Supreme Court of 

Civilization 



Dr. Karl Helfferlch, German Secretary of the Treasury, 

Reviews the "White," "Yellow," and "Orange" Papers, 

and Reaches a Different Conclusion from that 

of James M. Beck, Holding the Allies 

Responsible for the War 



NEW YORK 

The Fatherland Corporation 

1123 Broadway 

1915 



11 



3\\ 



Dr. Helfferich's brilliant analysis of the world 
situation was published first by George Stilke, 
Berlin, under the title of "The Genesis of the 
Great War." It appeared in the A^. I'. Times 
under the title under which it is here reprinted. 

D. of D, 
MAY 5 .19 5 



Tlce following is a translation from the semi-official Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Jan. 26 of an exhaustive compara- 
tive stiidii by Dr. Karl Eelfferich of the diplomatic documents 
published by the various icarring countries concerning the origin of 
the ivorld war. Dr. Eelfferich, ivliose accession to the office of Im- 
perial Secretary of the Treasury ivas hailed with satisfaction 
throughout Germany on Jan. 16, ivas then only 43 years old, but 
was considered the leading financial authority in Germany. At that 
time the German neivspapers pointed out that Dr. Uelfferich's ap- 
pointment spelled the end of the bureaucratic system theretofore 
regnant in the Treasury Department, and ivas auspicious for the 
efficient and thorough-going management of the office in the enor- 
mous luork that ivould be thrust upon it when terms of peace and 
final international settlements loould be made. 

Dr. Helfferich at the time of his appointment to the Secretary- 
ship of the Treasury was Director of the Deutsche Banh and Wirk- 
licher Legationsrat, (Actual Councillor of Legation,) with the title 
of Professor. It ivas he who introduced the recent Reichstag budget 
for 1915 in the Federal Council and Reichstag. 



GERMANY'S CASE IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CIVILIZATION 

By Dr. Karl Helfferich. 

The Governments of England, Eussia, and France thought, 
through the publication of the exchange of diplomatic writings of 
the days before the beginning of the world war, they could furnish 
a proof in the eyes of their own peoples and of the entire civilized 
world that the blame for the most gigantic shedding of blood which 
the world has ever experienced falls only upon "war-lusting 
Germany," and that they for their part did all in their power to 
avoid the catastrophe. England has published a "Blue Book," 
Eussia an "Orange Book," and France a "Yellow Book." A series 
of indications argue that these publications, which profess an 
appearance of completeness, show important gaps, and particularly 
in the case of the French "Yellow Book" the proof can be regarded 
as furnished that certain documents there republished were belatedly 
fabricated. [Note 1.] Nevertheless the publications deserve a 
careful comparative study. 

No attempt will be made here to follow in all their details the 
extraordinarily tangled diplomatic windings and cross-windings that 



[Note 1. — Thus the "Yellow Book," in its first chapter, entitled 
" Avertissements," contains a series of documents which, beginning 
from March, 1913, are intended to prove a growing war sentiment in 
Germany. Among them, designated as No. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a 
note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which is said: 

" M. von Kiderlen fut I'homme le plus hai' de I'Allemague, I'hiver 
dernier. Cependant il commence a n'etre.plus que deconsidere, car il 
laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa ravanche. " ("Herr von Kiderlen was 
last Winter the best-hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning 
to be only disliked (instead of hated,) for he allows it to be under- 
stood that he will take his revenge (for Morocco.") 

Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to 
meditate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, 
a fact which was manifestly not realized by that official of the Quai 
d'Orsay who belatedly fabricated this "Y^ellow Book" document. 

A similar misfortime happened in the case of a note which, accord- 
ing to the English "Blue Book," M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador 
to London, ostensibly handed on July 30, 1914, to the English Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, and the contents of which deal with the German 



6 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Chilization 

preceded the beginning of the war. Ratlier, it is here pertinent only 
to present to the world merely the most important happenings that 
brought on the war. by means of the evidence offered by the Triple 
Entente powers themselves. 

For this purpose, only those steps will next be ascertained which 
directly caused the outbreak of the war. Pursued from this point 
the threads will be followed backward and untangled as far as 
possible. 

The Firebrands. 

There can be no doubt about the direct cause of the war. The 
cause was the general mo])ilization of the Russian fighting forces 
on land and sea ordered by the Czar early on the morning of July 
31. and the refusal of Russia to rescind this measure as demanded 
by Germany. 

It is important to establi'^h right here tlie fact that the Russian 
Government was f ullv clear in its knowledge that the orderinoj of 
general mobilization and the maintenance of this step must make 
war with Germany inevitable. In official and unofficial ways it was 
made clear with all emphasis to the Russian Government in good 
time that a Russian mobilization meant the same as a German 
mobilization and a German mobilization meant the same as war. 
[Xote 2.] 

military preparations on the Alsace-Lorraine border ("Blue Book,'^ 
No. 105, Annex 3.) Through the dating of this note on July 30, the 
impression was to be created that at that time, and even in the days 
preceding, the German troops had already' stood close to the border 
and had even crossed the border through patrols. The note begins, 
in the wording of the third edition of the "Blue Book:" "L'armee 
allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontiers, hier par deux fois 
des patrouilles allemandes ont penetre sur notre territoire" ("the 
German Army has its advance posts on our border; yesterday the Ger- 
man patrols twice penetrated upon our territory.") 

"Yesterdav, " in a note transmitted on Julv 30, naturallv means 
July 29. The 29th of July was a Wednesday, 'in the first edition of 
the "Blue Book," however, it read "hier, vendredi" ("yesterday. 
Friday"); the "vendredi" was stricken out only afterward, when the 
inconsistency was noticed. From this it appears that the note osten- 
sibly transmitted on July 30 could at all events have been framed only 
on Sunday, Aug. 1, quite aside from the fact that no trespass across 
the border took place either on July 29 or July 30.1 

TNote 2. — According to the German "White Book" the German 
Ambassador in St. PetersV)urg was instructed on July 26 to hand to the 
Russian Government a declaration in which it was said: 

"Preparatory military measures on the part of Russia will conijiel 
US to take similar measures, which must consist in the mobilization of 
the army. But mobilization means war."] 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization T 

The reasons are patent and decisive. Germany, in view of the 
danger of a war on several fronts, could not possibly forego the 
advantage of time which was assured for it by the more speedy 
mobilization of its own forces, as soon as the situation shaped itself 
to a general Eussian mobilization. For this compelling reason of 
self-maintenance, Germany could not for a moment entertain the 
question of a mutual mobilization and then a state of expectant 
facing of one another. 

As a proof that this view of the case was also admitted by the 
allies of Kussia as quite self-evident, attention should be called to 
the report of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir G. 
Buchanan, on July 25 ("Blue Book," No. 17) Buchanan reports 
about an interview with the Eussian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonof : 

I said all I eoiild to impress prudence on the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and warned him that if Eussia mobilized, Germany would not 
be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out 
hers, but would probably declare war at once. 

Even at the last hour the German Kaiser in person, in his tele- 
gram of July 30 at 1 o\-lock in the afternoon, called the Czar's 
attention to the "dangers and heavy consequences of a mobilization." 

The Eussian Government and the Czar, therefore, in the order 
of general mobilization that followed on July 31. must have been 
quite clear in their minds that this order meant war. 

If hereby the direct cause of the outbreak of the war is estab- 
lished, there arises the question through what reasons the general 
Eussian mobilization was occasioned. 

We owe it to those who are responsible for the decisive steps to 
examine next the reasons which they themselves allege. 

Let us first listen to the Czar. 

In his telegram to the German Kaiser, of July 30, at 1:20 
o'clock in the afternoon, there is no suggestion of an impending 
general mobilization, but only a reference to the steps that had been 
taken against Austria-Hungary: 

The military measures now going into force were already decided 
upon five days ago, and that for reasons of defense against the prepara- 
tions of Austria-Hungary. 

This telegram crossed in transit the telegram of the Kaiser 
mentioned above, which called attention to the heavy conse- 



8 Germany'' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

quences of a Russian mobilization and which moreover expressed 
the fear that even a mobilization directed exclusively against Aus- 
tria-Hungary would endanger, if it would not make impossible, the 
role of mediator which the Kaiser had undertaken at the request 
of the Czar. The Czar replied on July 31, at 2 o'clock in the 
afternoon, at an hour in which the order of general mobilization of 
the entire Russian fighting forces had already been issued : 

It is impossible, for technical reasons, to stop our military prepara- 
tions which have been made necessary by the mobilization of Austria- 
Hungary. 

Either through the expression "our military preparations" there 
is meant only the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary; 
in which case the Czar in this telegram ignores the already com- 
pleted general mobilization directed against Germany, which to be 
sure, would be the simplest method of saving all efforts to find a 
justification; or, on the other hand, "our military preparations" 
means the general mobilization ; in which case the Czar was able to 
allege only the military measures of Austria-Hungary as Justifica- 
tion for this decisive step. 

Now let us listen to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Concerning the reasons alleged by the latter, the French Am- 
bassador at St. Peterslnirg on July 31 reported to his CTOvernment: 

En raison de la mobilisation geuerale de I'Autriche et des mesures 
de mobilisation prises secretement, mais d 'uue maniere continue, par 
I'Allemagne depuis six jours, I'ordre de la mobilisation generale russe 
a ete donne. (For the reason of the general mobilization of Austria 
and measures of mobilization taken secretly but in a continuous manner 
by Germany for six days, the order of general Russian mobilization 
has been given.) ("Yellow Book," No. 118.) 

On the same day the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
reports to Sir Edward Grey ("Blue Book." Xo. 113) that the 
general mobilization was ordered in consequence of a report of the 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna that Austria-Hungary was de- 
termined not to tolerate an intervention of the powers and that 
it was setting its troops into motion not only against Serbia, but 
also against Russia, There is added : 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active 
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 9 

In the Eussian "Orange Book" itself one will seek in vain for 
the reason for the general mobilization. The communications con- 
cerning this decisive step, which without doubt were made to the 
Russian Ambassadors abroad, are not repeated, and the reader 
learns about the fact of the Eussian mobilization against Germany 
only through the circular telegram in which Sazonof informs the 
chiefs of the Eussian legations about the demand of Germany for 
the rescinding of the mobilization. 

What, now, are the reasons for the general Eussian mobilization 
that are given in the English and French Ambassadors' reports and 
the telegram of the Czar to the German Kaiser? 

Bussian Mobilization. 

1. — The General Eussian Mobilization as a Eeply to the 
Military Measures of Austria-Hungary. — In order to provide 
protection against the alleged military preparations of Austria- 
Hungary against Russia, thirteen army corps had already been 
mobilized by Eussia on July 29, (report of the French Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg on July 29, 'bellow Book," Ko. 100.) The 
mobilization in the districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan 
was announced through the Eussian Ambassador in Berlin to the 
German Government, with the justification that this measure was 
the reply to the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against 
Serbia, which had taken place on the day before, and to the 
"mesures de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande partie 
de I'armee austro-hongroise." ("Yellow Book," No. 95.) As a 
matter of fact, Austria-Hungary, until the time of the general Eus- 
sian mobilization, had mobilized only eight army corps. Contrary 
to the assertion of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg of 
July 31, ("Yellow Book," No. 118,) (see Note 3,) a general mobili- 
zation in Austria-Hungary had not yet been ordered at the moment 
of the Russian general mobilization. Such an order, indeed, 
followed more as an answer to the Eussian general mobilization in 
the course of July 31. The mobilization of thirteen army corps 

[Note 3. — This false assertion, which was never maintained by the 
Eussian side itself, of the general Austrian mobilization that was said 
for its part to have induced Russia to make a general mobilization, 
reappears at various points in the French "Yellow Book"; thus, in 
the circular note of Viviani of Aug. 1 (No. 127) "I'Autriche a la 
premilre, precede h une mobilization genfirale" ("Austria was the 
first to proceed to a general mobilization.")] 



10 Germany^s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

ordered by Eussia on July 29 was, as a counter-measure to the 
mobilization of eight Austro-IIungarian anny corps, in itself 
excessive and challenging. Nothing had happened on the part of 
the Danul)e Monarchy after July 29 that could have offered Russia 
occasion to proceed from the very extensive partial mobilization to 
the general mobilization which made the war inevitable. 

2. — The Alleged Militaky PnErAKATioNS of Germany 
Against Russia. — The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in that 
critical time repeatedly saw and spoke to the German Ambassador 
each day. If the Russian Government thought it had knowledge of 
measures of mobilization which Germany was alleged to have made 
as long as six days before, that is to say, since July 25 ("Yellow 
Book," No. 118,) then nothing would have been more natural than 
for M. Sazonof to ask Count Pourtales for explanation concerning 
this alleged mobilization, or to have called his attention to the fact 
that such measures could not remain without counter-measures on 
the part of Russia. An indication by Sazonof concerning these 
alleged German preparations would have been given all the more 
because Count Pourtales in those days repeatedly called attention 
to the dangers of the Russian military preparations. So, on July 
29, with the result that Sazonof confined himself to replying 
thereto : 

Que les preparatifs russes sont motives: d'une cote par I'intran- 
sigeance obstinee de I'Autriche d 'autre part, par le fait que huit corps 
austro-hongrois, sont deja mobilises (that the Kussian preparations are 
motived on the one hand by the obstinate intransigeance of Austria, 
and on the other by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian corps are 
already mobilized.) ("Yellow Book," No. 100.) 

On July 30 also Count Pourtales reverted to the Russian prepa- 
rations without Sazonof's feeling himself called upon to ask a ques- 
tion in turn about the alleged German measures of mobilization. 
("Yellow Book," No. 103.) The Czar, too, in his telegram to the 
German Kaiser, at no time and no place mentions anything what- 
ever about the German military measures, which, according to the 
presentation of the facts offered by his Government, furnished a 
reason for the Russian general mobilization. 

Gennan Preparations. 

The falsity of the justification of the Russian general mobiliza- 
tion by means of the German measures is fully exposed by the 



Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 11 

fact that the French "Yellow Book" confirms the fact (No. 102) 
that the Eussian Chief of the General Staff on July 29 gave his 
word of honor to the German Military Attache that the military 
measures of Eussia were directed exclusively against Austria- 
Hungary and not against Germany also. If Eussia believed it 
knew of military measures taken by Germany, would the Eussian 
Chief of the General Staff then have had any occasion to give such 
a word of honor? And if information had belatedly been received 
by the Eussian Government concerning threatening German mili- 
tary preparations — as M. Sazonof, to be sure, asserted to the French 
and English Ambassadors, but never to the German Ambassador — 
would not the Eussian Chief of the General Staff then have had the 
most urgent occasion, because of the word of honor he had given, 
to speak to the German Military Attache alwut the changed situa- 
tion presented as a result of such information, and to do this, too, 
before the irremediable step of general Eussian mobilization had 
been taken? Nothing of all this happened. Eussia has justified 
its general mobilization only to third powers, by the alleged German 
measures ; but to the German Kaiser, the German Ambassador, and 
the German Military Attache, however, it never uttered a word of 
inquiry, much less of complaint against the alleged German prepa- 
rations, but rather gave calming assurances constantly. 

3. — The Eefusal of Austria-Hungary to Permit an Inter- 
vention BY THE Powers. — This attempt at Justifieation, trans- 
mitted by the English Ambassador to London, is almost grotesque 
in its effect, in conjunction with the fact that a new proposal for 
mediation emanating from Sir Edward Grey had already been 
transmitted once by the German Government to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government on the preceding day, and that the reply of 
Austria- Hungary to this proposal had not yet been given; that, 
furthermore, on the afternoon of July 30, a conversation had taken 
place in Vienna between Count Berchtold and the Eussian Am- 
bassador, which the French Ambassador in Vienna at once tele- 
graphed to Paris as an interview of great importance, ("Un 
entretien de haute importance,") and which, in his opinion, per- 
mitted the l)elief to be entertained that not every prospect of a 
localization of the conflict was lost, ("Permettait de croire que toute 
chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue.") ("Yellow Book," 
No. 104.) 

The proposal of mediation made by Sir Edward Grey on July 



12 Germcmy*s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

29 suggested: Austria-Hungary should undertake, after the occu- 
pation of Belgrade and the Serljian territory at the horder, not to 
advance further, while the powers would try to bring it about that 
Serbia should give to Austria-Hungary a satisfaction adequate for 
that monarchy. The territory occupied by the Austro-Hungarian 
Army should be evacuated again after the satisfaction had been 
rendered. Sir Edward Grey conveyed this proposal on July 30 to 
the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and added : 

I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, 
and if it can be obtained I would earnestly hope that it might be 
agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. ("Blue 
Book," No. 103.) 

This proposal was transmitted and recommended by Germany 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government; similarly by the English 
and French Ambassadors to the Russian Government ("Yellow 
Book,'' No. 112.) The proposal was not yet answered by Austria, 
and Eussia, too, had not yet taken any attitude concerning it, when 
the general Russian mobilization ensued. The assertion that the 
Russian general mobilization had been made necessary because 
Austria-Hungary declined all intervention by the powers, ("Blue 
Book," No. 113,) is thus in strict contradiction to the state of 
affairs as pictured in the English and French documents. 

Much more important than the fact that Russia played out 
the card of general mobilization, while an as yet undisposed of 
English proposal of mediation lay before its Government and that 
of Austria-Hungary, is the direct conversation which took place 
on the evening before the general Russian mobilization between the 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna, M. Schebeko, and Count Berchtold. 
Let it be recalled that after Sir Edward Grey's first proposal of 
conference had encountered difficulties, Sazonof himself had taken 
the initiative toward direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary and 
that this initiative had at first been rejected in "Vienna. ("Blue 
Book," No, 74.) In the conversation of July 30 the difficulties in 
the way of the direct exchange of views were obviated. According 
to the cited report of the French Ambassador, ("Yellow Book," No. 
104,) who was informed of it by the Russian Ambassador as was 
his English colleague immediately after the conversation, M. 
Schebeko and Count Berchtold examined the terrible difficulties 
that were present, with the equal good will to find solutions that 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 13 

might be acceptable to both sides, (avec une egal bonne volonte d'y 
adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptables.) The Russian 
Ambassador declared that the military preparations of Russia had 
no other purpose than to safeguard against the Austro-Hungarian 
measures and to announce the intention and the right of the Czar 
to have a voice in the settlement of the Serbian question. Count 
Berchtold answered with the declaration that the Austro-Hungarian 
preparations in Galicia likewise emanated from no purpose of 
aggression whatsoever. On both sides it was agreed to labor toward 
the end that the measures should not be interpreted as hostile steps. 
The report of the French Ambassador then continues : 

Pour le reglement du conflit Austro-Serbe il a ete convenu que les 
pourparlers seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. Sazonof et le Comte 
Szapary; s'ils out ete interrompus, c'est par le suite d'un malentendu, 
le Comte Berchtold croyant que le Ministre des Affaires etrangers de 
Russie reclamait pour sou interlocuteur des pouvoirs qui lui permet- 
traient de modifier les termes de Tultimatum autrichien. Le Comte 
Szapary sera seulement autorise a discuter quel accommodement serait 
compatible, avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont 
Edward Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directe- 
et reduite aux deux plus interessees q'aurait lieu I'examen que Sir 
Edward Grey Proposait de coufier aux quatre Puissauces non directe- 
ment interessees. Sir M. de Buusen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a 
aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que le Foreign Office approuvera 
entierement cette nouvelle procedure. (With regard to the settlement 
of the Austro-Serbian dispute, it was agreed that the pourparlers shall 
be resumed in St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. 
Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold 
believing that the Eussian Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that 
his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the 
terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be author- 
ized to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity 
and the prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an object 
of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct 
form, confined to the two most interested parties, that the examina- 
tion of the situation will take place, which Sir Edward Grey proposed 
should be undertaken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir 
M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that the 
Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure.) 

The Kaiser's Telegram. 

On the following day the Russian Ambassador in Berlin received 
the communication that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg confirmed the declaration of Count Berchtold to M. 



14 German jffi Cuftc in the Supreme Court of Chilization 

Schebeko, with the explanation tliat liis Ciovernment was ready to 
discuss with tlie Russian Government the note to Serbia, even con- 
cerning its material content ("que son Gouvernement etait pret a 
discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note a la Serbie, meme quant 
au fond") ("Yellow Book," No. 21.) 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had thus on July 30 taken 
a decisive step on the road of compliance, in resuming the direct 
negotiations with Eussia, and thereby declared itself ready to enter 
upon a till then stubbornly declined discussion of the material con- 
tents of the note addressed to Serbia. The reason for this decisive 
compliance on the part of Austria-Hungary, which for the moment 
was bound' to remove the acute character of the crisis, appears 
forthwith if one examines the German "White Book." On July 28 
the Gernfan Kaiser had telegraphed to the Czar: 

Eemenibering the cordial friendship which has long united us two 
with a firm bond, I am therefore exerting all my influence to induce 
Austria-Hungary to strive for an open and satisfying understanding 
with Eussia. 

And in the telegram to tlie Czar on July 29 the Kaiser said: 

I believe that a direct understanding between your Government and 
Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which, as I have 
already telegraphed to you, my Government is laboring with all its 
power to further. 

Tlie Kaiser addcnl, as may hero l)e emphasized: 

Naturally military measures on the part of Eussia that could be 
interpreted by Austria-Hungary as a threat would hasten a misfortune 
which we both wish to avoid, and would also undermine my position 
as an intermediary which — as your appeal to my friendship and help — 
I readily assumed. 

This sequence of facts is confirmed by a telegram of Sir Edward 
Grey to the English Ambassador at St. Petcrsljurg on July 31. 
(Blue Book No. 110.) according to which the German Ambassador 
in London communicated to Grey "as a result of suggestions by the 
German Government," that an expression of views had taken place 
in A^'ienna between Count Berchtokl and M. Schebeko, and that the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been in- 
structed to get into communication with the Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to give the latter explanations concerning the 



Germany' s Case in the Supreme Court of Cimlization 15 

Aiistro-Hiingarian ultimatvmi to Serbia and to discuss all the 
Aiistro-Hungarian-Eussian relations concerning suggestions and 
questions. Sir Edward Grey added that he had taken cognizance of 
this resumption of direct conversations between Kussia and Austria- 
Hungary with great satisfaction. 

Contrary to the assertions of the French "Yellow Book'^ that 
Germany at no stage of the proceedings seriously counseled in 
Vienna toward a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions, it is 
thus established firmly that upon the intercession of the German 
Kaiser the Austro-Hungarian Government on the afternoon of July 
30, yielded to the Eussian wish, till then consistently rejected, for a 
discussion of the note to Serbia. It is further shown by the French 
"Yellow Book" that the Kussian Ambassador in Vienna attributed 
the greatest importance to the conciliatory declaration of Count 
Berchtold and immediately instructed his French and English 
colleagues about this declaration. It is further established through 
the French "Yellow Book" that the French Ambassador in Vienna 
based the hope of a localizing of the conflict upon the conciliatory 
stand of Count Berchtold, and that the English Ambassador, with- 
out first inquiring back in London, expressed the complete agree- 
ment of the Foreign Office in the proccnlure discussed between 
Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador. 

But it is furthermore a fact that the Eussian "Orange Book" 
shows not a trace of this decisive attitude of concession on the 
part of Austria-Hungary, and finally, that this attitude of con- 
cession on the part of Austria-Hungary was answered by the Rus- 
sian Government with the general mol^ilization which made the war 
inevitable. 

Blames Russian War Party. 

To this is to be attributed the fact that the general mobilization 
came as a complete surprise to the two Entente associates of Russia 
who, according to their own documents, had welcomed the con- 
ciliatory spirit of Austria-Hungary with great satisfaction as a 
hope of peace. Proof of this : On July 31 at 7 o'clock in the 
evening, the German Ambassador at Paris spoke to the French 
President of Ministers and Foreign Minister, M. Viviani, to inform 
him that Germany was compelled by the general mobilization of 
Russia to proclaim the state of threatening danger of war, and to 
demand that Russia demobilize. 



16 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

To this M. Viviani replied: 

That he was in no way informed of the alleged mobilization of 
the Eussian Army and Navy (nullement renseignfi sur une pretendue 
mobilisation totale de I'armee et de la flotte russes,) ("Yellow Book," 
No. 117.) 

The English Ambassador at Paris, too, reported late in the 
evening of July 31 to the Foreign Office that his colleague Iswolsky 
was not in the slightest aware of a general Eussian mobilization. 
("Blue Book," No. 117.) 

If, therefore, the reasons alleged by Russia for the sudden 
general mobilization were merely transparent pretexts, and if 
Eussia broke the momentous measure in question across its knee, 
without even informing England and France at that moment, when 
an English proposal for mediation that was full of hope had been 
spread out, and when the compliance of Austria-Huagary effected 
by Germany must have obviated the acute danger of war, then there 
remains only one explanation for this : 

The personages who had the deciding voice at that moment in 
Eussia, in view of the compliance of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment that was manifesting itself as a result of German efforts, 
desired to break off all the bridges that led to peace and to make 
the war inevitable. 

If this patent conclusion needed a further corroboration, that 
would be provided by the attitude of Eussia after the transmission 
of the German ultimatum. 

While Germany, which had heretofore designated the Eussian 
mobilization as a casus belli, was content for the time being to pro- 
claim the state of threatening danger of war, which is not yet 
equivalent to mobilization, and left the Eussian Government twelve 
hours (ending at noon on Aug. 1) in which to rescind its mobiliza- 
tion, Eussia left the German Ambassador without any answer 
whatsoever, and made no attempt whatever to avert the utmost 
extreme by the intermediation of a third party; but, on the other 
hand, in the night of Aug. 1 to 2 opened hostilities at three points 
on the Prussian frontier. 

In the face of this indisputable state of facts, the French 
Government dares to offer the following presentation of the case 
(Circular note of the French Government of Aug. 1, "Yellow 
Book," No. 120) : 

Austria-Hungary has at last allowed itself to be found ready to 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 17 

discuss materially the contents of its ultimatum to Serbia. Kussia 
is ready, on the basis of the English proposal, to enter into negotia- 
tions ("le Gouvernement russe est pret a entrer en negociation sur 
la base de Ta proposition anglaise.") Unfortunately, these pros- 
pects for a peaceful solution are destroyed by the ultimatum of 
Germany which demands demobilization of Russia. The ultimatum 
is unjustified, since Russia has accepted the English proposition 
which includes a stopping of military preparations ("puisque la 
Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui implique un arret des 
preparatifs militaires de toutes les puissances.") Germany's atti- 
tude proves that it wants the war. 

History in the making can scarcely be falsified more light- 
heartedly than this. 

It is true, to be sure, that Austria-Hungary showed itself to be 
compliant and thereby gave all justification to hope for peace. But 
the French circular note keeps quiet the fact that this compliance 
is to be traced to the influence of Germany; the French Foreign 
Minister had even the face to assert in the Chamber of Deputies 
on Aug. 4 that Germany — from July 24 imtil its ultimatum handed 
in on July 31, under the pretext (!) of the general mobilization 
ordered by Russia — had not participated by any positive actions in 
the pacific conciliatory efl'orts of the Triple Entente ("Yellow 
Book," No. 159.) 

It is false that Russia accepted the English proposition which 
included the cessation of military preparations by all the powers 
and that thereby it deprived the German ultimatum in advance of 
all justification. 

In the second place, the English proposition above mentioned 
("Blue Book," No. 103) did not contain the condition of the 
stopping of all military preparations, but rather only the earnest 
hope was expressed by Sir Edward Grey that with the acceptance 
of his proposition the military preparations would be halted by all 
sides. Furthermore, Russia did not accept the English proposition, 
neither before nor after the transmission of the German ultimatum ; 
the circular note of Viviani, ("Yellow Book," No. 120,) which in 
its fifth paragraph asserts the completed acceptance of the English 
proposition, itself states in its fourth paragraph that the Russian 
Government was "pret a entre en negociation sur la base de la 
proposition anglaise," and certainly there is a difference between the 
acceptance of a proposition and the willingness to negotiate on the 



18 Germany^s Case in the Supreme Court of ChUization 



basis thereof. But, as a matter of fact, Russia's Foreign Minister 
did not even declare himself ready to enter upon netrotiations on 
the basis of the English proposition; rather, he made a counter- 
proposal to the English Ambassador, which differed essentially from 
the English proposition, as the following comparison shows : 



Kussian Counter-Proposition, 
("Orange Book," No. 67.) 

Si I'Autriche consent a arreter 
la marche de ses armees sur le 
territoire serbe, (If Austria con- 
sents to halt the advance of its 
armies on Serbian territory,) 



English Proposition, 
("Blue Book," No. 103.) 

Austria, after taking Belgrade 
and Serbian territory in region of 
frontier, to promise not to advance 
further. 



et si, reconnaissant que le conflit 
austro-serbe a assume le caractere 
d'une question europeenne, (and 
if, recognizing that the Austro- 
Serbian conflict has assumed the 
character of a European question,) 

elle admet que les Grandes Puis- 
sances examjnent la satisfaction 
que la Serbie pourrait accorder au 
Gouvernement d 'Autriche-Hongrie, 
(Austria admits that the great 
powers may examine the satisfac- 
tion which Serbia could accord to 
the Government of Austria-Hun- 
gary,) 

sans laisser porter atteinte a ses 
droits d 'Etat souverain et a son 
independence, (without injury to 
its rights as a sovereign State and 
its independence,) 
la Russia s 'engage a conserver son 
attitude expectante, (Russia en- 
gages to maintain its expectant 
attitude,) 



Sir Edward Grey had not asked 
for this recognition, and the 
Austro-Hungarian Government had 
steadily declined to permit its con- 
flict with Serbia to be treated as 
a European question — 

while powers endeavored to ar- 
range that Serbia should give 
satisfaction sufiicient to pacify 
Austria — 



this condition which, moreover, 
had already been fulfilled by the 
declaration of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government, did not figure 
in the English proposition, but 
rather there was therein provided 
that Austria-Hungary, after satis- 
faction had been received, was to 
evacuate again the occupied Ser- 
bian territory. ("Territory occu- 
pied would of course be evacuated 
when Austria was satisfied.") 



— which expectant attitude heretofore had consisted in the progress 
of the warlike preparations up to the general mobilization. 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of CkiUzation 19 

Such a counter-proposition, which is marked by an ahnost classi- 
cal naivete, the French Government before its diplomatic repre- 
sentatives, its Chamber, and the civilized world calls : the acceptance 
of the English proposition which included the stopping of military 
preparations. 

That Eussia, moreover, did not even think of stopping its 
military preparations is confirmed by M. Sazonof himself very 
emphatically on July 31, on the occasion of the presentation of his 
counter-proposition to the English Ambassador, in declaring to him 
"it was of course impossible to stop a mobilization which was al- 
ready in progress." 

N"o distortion, no matter how unabashed, can obscure the fact 
that after the Austro-Hungarian attitude of conciliation induced 
by Germany had given anew ground to hope for the nuiintenance 
of peace, Russia, without notifying either its opponent or its allies, 
precipitated the general mobilization that sealed the war, whilst 
Germany refrained with its counter-measures to the very limit of 
self-preservation. The authoritative circles of Russia wanted the 
war, and wanted it with redoubled brutality when the prospect of 
a peaceful settlement showed itself. 

The Accomplices. 

If the foregoing deductions, which one and all are leased solely 
upon the documents of the Triple Entente Governiuents, show the 
incontrovertible certainty that the authoritative circle in Russia 
wanted the war and forced it, there arises the question how this 
determination, so universally momentous in its responsibilities, 
came to be adopted. 

The compelling reason "of self-preservation will not hold, for 
Russia was menaced by no one. 

The protection of Serbia also will not hold, for, aside from the 
fact that Serbia stood in no relationship of protection that imposed 
protection, morally or politically, upon Russia as a duty, Austria- 
Hungary had pledged itself to the various great powers to preserve 
the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. 

Even the maintenance of the Russian prestige in the Balkans 
was, after the attitude of conciliation shown by Austria-Hungary, 
no longer an issue that could justify an appeal to arms. 

The bringing on of the war was, therefore, for Russia a question 
pure and simple of opportunity. In lack of compelling reasons, 



20 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

the decision for the war could only be brought about by the convic- 
tion: the opportunity is favorable for forcing down those great 
powers which appeared to the authoritative Eussian personages as 
obstacles in their course. 

Left to depend upon itself alone, Eussia would have risked the 
war with Austria-Hungary and Germany only in an extreme case 
in the defense of national vital interests, but never as a result of 
weighing the probable result. Only the assurance of the active co- 
operation of other great powers could therefore have made possible 
the determination of the leading circles of Eussia for war. The 
attitude of the two other powers of the Triple Entente must there- 
fore be of decisive influence for the Eussian determination. 

Of this the documents of the Triple Entente Governments con- 
tain the corroboration. 

The co-operation of France was by no means assured a priori, 
much less the co-operation of England. The Franco-Eussian 
treaty of alliance did not pledge France to an unconditional ac- 
companiment of Eussia in war, and between Eussia and England 
there existed no sort of precise agreement. In the Austro-Hun- 
garian-Serbian conflict lluil arose out of the assassination of the 
Austro-Hungarian heir apjiarent and his wife, the sympathies of 
those not directly concerned could only be on the side of Austria- 
Hungary. On that point they were clear also in Eussia, and this 
clearness of view was shown by the fact that the Eussian Govern- 
ment, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
to Serbia, displayed a certain caution for a time. 

French Circular Note. 

Thus the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg wired to his 
Government on July 24 ("Yellow Book," No. 31.) after Sazonof 
had received cognizance of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, 
that the dispositions of the Czar and his Ministers were of the most 
peaceful; and on July 25 ("Yellow Book," No. 38) : 

M. Sazonof garde toute sa moderation: II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, 
tout ce qui pourrait precipiter la erise. J'estime que, meme si le 
Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait a Paction contre la Serbie, nous 
ne devrions pas rompre les negociations (M. Sazonof maintains all his 
moderation: It is necessary, he told me, to avoid everything that can 
precipitate the crisis. I am of the opinion that even if the Austro- 
Hungarian Government should pass to action against Serbia we should 
not break off negotiations). 



Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 21 

On July 26 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in a 
circular note ("Yellow Book," No. 50) : 

De P^tersbourg nous apprenons que M. Sazonof a conseille a la 
Serbie de demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres 
du 25, tenu en presence de I'Empereur, la mobilisation de treize corps 
d'armee 6ventuellement destines a operer centre I'Autriche a ete 
envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois rendu effective que si 
I'Autriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des armes, et seulement 
apres avis du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a qui le soin incombe 
de fixer la date, liberte lui etant laissee de continuer les negociations 
meme dans le cas ou Belgrade serait occupee. (From St. Petersburg 
we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for English media- 
tion. In the Council of Ministers of the 25th, held in the presence of 
the Emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps, eventually 
destined against Austria, was envisaged; but this mobilization is to be- 
come effective only if Austria does violence to Serbia, and only according 
to the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom shall be left 
the fixing of the date, in which he is at liberty to continue the nego- 
tiations even in the ease of the occupation of Belgrade.) 

That this moderation was not genuine appears even from the 
fact that M. Sazonof as early as the 24th of July declared to the 
English Ambassador ("Blue Book/' No. 6) : "that Russian 
mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out," from which 
it appears that the Russian mobilization was already in progress on 
July 24, the day on which the Austro-Hungarian note was an- 
nounced, whilst the French circular note of July 26 ("Yellow 
Book," No. 50) has the partial mobilization against Austria-Hun- 
gary "envisaged" only on July 25, and makes its going into force 
contingent upon the Austrian force of arms against Serbia and 
the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is nevertheless 
important, however, that the Russian and French Governments at 
that time still wished to call attention to the outward moderation. 

The reason is manifestly that the Russian Government at that 
time was not yet sure of the co-operation of the English Govern- 
ment, and even of that of the French Government. In the conversa- 
tion which Sazonof at his request had on July 24 at the house of 
the French Ambassador with the latter and Sir G. Buchanan, 
("Blue Book," No. 6,) Sazonof demanded that England should 
declare its solidarity with Russia and France, whereupon Buchanan 
very shrewdly replied : 



22 Germaiuj's Case in the Supreme Court of CizHization 

I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Govern- 
ment, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of 
solidarity from his Majesty 's Government that would entail an uncon- 
ditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by 
arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf 
of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. 

How the French Ambassador acted towards M, Sazonof cannot 
be establislied absolutel}^ for the French "Yellow Book"' signifi- 
cantly contains no report about this important conversation, and 
Sir Ci. Buchanan confines himself in his report to saying that his 
French colleague had given him to understand ("gave me to under- 
stand") that France would fulfill all duties imjwsed by its alliance 
with ]{ussia. Such an attitude left open the neutrality of France 
in a liussian war of aggression. As a matter of fact, as we shall 
see later, France gave to the Russian Government its consent to 
unconditional armed help only at a later stage of the case. 

We shall now consider how the attitude of PVance and England 
developed. 

France. 

The French Government manifestly found itself in a heavy 
dilemma. On the one side its entire policy for decades was based 
upon the closest junction with Russia; on the other hand, there 
weighed heavily the responsibility to take a stand unconditionally 
with Russia in the bad Serbian matter and to risk alone with Russia 
a war against Germany and Austria- Hungary. 

Therefore the French statesmen were moved by a double fear: 
the fear of awakening distrust in the Russian Government, and of 
isolating France by a loosening of the Franco-Russian relation ; the 
second, the fear of standing alone with Russia in a war against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

The effect of the first fear was that the French Government 
refused to attempt any influence in St. Petersburg in a pacific 
sense, which might there be interpreted as a defection of France 
from Russia. The various urgent steps taken by the German 
Ambassador in Paris after the handing over of the Austro-Hun- 
garian note to Serbia, in order to impress upon the French Cabinet 
the gravity of the situation and to point out how necessary a 
moderating influence of France was in St. Petersburg, were al- 
ways received with the greatest distrust and suspected of being 
attempts to drive a wedge between France and Russia. 



Germany s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 23 

When, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
matum to Serbia, the German Ambassador in Paris gave to the 
French Government the correct and faithful explanation that the 
German Government regarded the matter as one that should be 
settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and de- 
sired urgently the localization of the conflict, since every interven- 
tion of another power might, by the natural play of the existing 
alliances, bring on incalculable consequences, the echo of this com- 
munication was an article in the "Echo de Paris," the intimate 
relations of which to the Quai d'Orsay are well known. In this 
article, the step of the German Ambassador was branded as a 
"menace allemande." ("Yellow Book," No. 36.) 

When, two days later, on July 26, the German Ambassador sug- 
gested to the French Government to interfere w"ith the Russian 
Government in a pacific sense, and added that Austria-Hungary, 
according to the declarations given to Eussia, was seeking neither 
territorial aggrandizement nor impairment of the integrity of 
Serbia, but only to safeguard itself, the answer was that Russia 
had done nothing that could cause apprehension concerning its 
moderation ; but that Germany should intervene in Vienna in order 
to prevent military operations against Serbia ("Yellow Book," No. 
56.) And when the German Ambassador, warned by the attitude 
of the "Echo de Paris," made the proposition to issue a notice to 
the press concerning the conversation, in which notice it should 
be said that he had in a new conversation with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs examined in a friendly spirit and with the feeling 
of pacific solidarity the means of preserving peace, then the thought 
of the public announcement of a "solidarite pacifiqne" with Germany 
awakened a veritable terror ("Yellow Book," No. 57,) and the 
notice suggested by the German Ambassador was finally issued to 
the press without the suspicious expression concerning the solidarity 
and the friendly spirit: "Cette redaction, volontairement terne, 
evitait une solidarite I'Allemagne qui pourrait etre mal interpretee 
("this purposely colorless editing avoided a solidarity with 
Germany which might be falsely interpreted.") So to be read in 
a circular note which the French Foreign Office addressed to its 
foreign embassies concerning this important case. ("Yellow Book," 
No. 63.) The same circular note adds that the probable explana- 
tion of Herr von Schoen's step was that he was seeking to compro- 
mise France in the eyes of Russia ("a compromettre la France au 



24 Germemy' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

regard de la Eussie.") The French Foreign Minister, p. i., announces 
in a further circular note of July 29 his pride that the German 
Ambassador had sought in vain to draw Germany into a Franco- 
German action toward solidarity in St. Petersburg, ("a vainement 
tente de mous entrainer dans une action solidarie franco-allemande 
a Petersbourg.") He repeats the assertion that the Eussian Govern- 
ment had given the greatest proofs of its moderation and that 
Eussia in no way threatened the peace, but that on the other hand 
negotiations must be conducted in Vienna and that all danger 
emanated from Vienna. ("Yellow Book," No. 85.) 

From no document of the French "Yellow Book," and as little 
from the Eussian "Orange Book" and the English "Blue Book," 
does it appear that France at any stage ventured to give the Eussian 
Government an earnest counsel in a pacific sense, unless it be con- 
sidered that the expression of the wish that Eussia might avoid 
measures which could give Germany a pretext for mobilization 
("Yellow Book," No. 102) be regarded as a sincere mediation for 
peace, while as a matter of fact such wishes are more properly to 
be regarded as tactical hints to detain Germany until the assurance 
of armed help from England, toward which France was at that 
tim^ working with all means at its disposal, should be attained. 

The unconditional safeguarding of the English alliance, not 
any mediatory activity whatsoever, was in those critical days the 
goal of the labors of French diplomats; and as long as this goal 
was not attained, the decisive word to Eussia was also not uttered. 
No matter if the impression is given a hundred times in the French 
"Yellow Book" that French assistance of Eussia was axiomatic, 
so axiomatic that a special declaration on this point to Eussia — 
which one seeks in vain in the French "Yellow Book" — was not at 
all necessary — ^but the Eussian "Orange Book" knows better. In 
this there is contained a telegraphic statement of Sazonof to 
Isvolsky, printed as of June 29, ("Orange Book," No. 58,) and that, 
too, as the last of the ten documents dated July 29, so that we 
may assume that this telegram was dispatched only late in the 
evening of July 29. In the statement Isvolsky is authorized 

d'exprimer au Gouvernement frangaise notre sincSre reconnaissance 
pour la declaration que 1 'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son 
nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entiSrement sur I'appui de 
notre alli6e la France (to express to the French Government our sin- 
cere gratitude for the declaration which the French Ambassador has 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 25 

made to me in its name, that we may count upon the full and complete 
support of France as our ally.) 

Sazonof added: 

Dans les circonstanees actuelles cette declaration nous est particu- 
lierement precieuse (under the present circumstances this declaration is 
especially precious to us.) 

From this it appears that France on the evening of July 29, 
not earlier and not later, gave to Russia expressly and without con- 
ditions its declaration of armed assistance. 

Why not earlier? And why did France on July 29 find the 
ability to make up its mind to this decisive step ? 

The key lies with 

England. 

The relation of France to England bears, since 1905, the official 
name of the "entente cordiale." A good understanding, not an 
alliance. In the English Parliament, the Ministers responsible for 
the foreign policy have always declared that there existed no treaty 
obligation whatsoever for the cordial good understanding between 
the two nations; for England there was said to be no binding 
obligation; Parliament's power of decision was said to have been 
encroached upon in advance in no way. 

Today we know more. 

Between Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State of the British 
Foreign Office and M. Paul Cambon as Ambassador of the French 
Republic letters were exchanged on November 22 and 23, 1912, of 
which the letter of Grey — which Paul Cambon merely confirms in 
approximately the same words — may here be inserted. ("Blue 
Book," No. 105, Annex 1 :) 

Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912. 

My dear Ambassador: 

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval 
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either 
Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the 
other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between 
experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that 
commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not 
arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the 



20 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Cixnlizntion 

French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not 
based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might 
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon 
the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the 
general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both 
Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve 
the peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take 
in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the Gen- 
eral Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Govern- 
ments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, 
&c. E. GREY. 



This liistorical document shows that the British and Frencli 
army and admiralty staffs had worked out and agreed upon plans 
for joint action by land and sea. There could be no doubt as to 
who was the sole opponent against whom these plans were to be 
directed. The plans made in common were kept alive by regularly 
recurring conferences between the English and French military and 
naval authorities. The -details for effecting joint action of the land 
and sea forces of both sides were not formulated, but the decision 
of the question whether or not there was to be such joint action was 
left for the moment when an emergency should arise. 

Thus the English Government was justified in maintaining 
that she had made no actual alliance with France. But it is clear 
that the arrangement of operations in common between two great 
powers and the continuous consultation regarding such plans of 
operation cannot be a mere way of passing the time. Even if 
nothing else is taken into consideration but the intimate knowledge 
which each must obtain of the strength of the other, it is clear that 
such conduct can be possible only if both sides are seriously con- 
sidering acting together. To throw more light on the actual mean- 
ing of the correspondence — in itself not binding — attention may 
also be called to the fact that France, trusting to the plan of 
operations agreed upon with England, concentrated her fleet in the 
Mediterranean and left the protection of her channel and Atlantic 
seaboard to the English fleet. Was not England at least morally 
bound by this very definite fact? 



Germany\s Case in the Supreme Court of Ci'mlization 27 
Grey's Early Moves. 

Sophists try to deceive not only others but themselves. Sir 
Edward Grey, at the beginning of the conflict, seems to have tried 
to make himself believe that he possessed a freedom which he really 
did not. Only by bearing this in mind can one explain his taking 
npon himself the role — foredoomed to failure — of wishing to be a 
mediator in a case to which he was in reality a party. 

AVhcther he wished it or not, this dual attitude was bound to 
lead to insincerity. 

All one has to do is to refer to the English "Blue Book," No. 17, 
in order to see how Sir G. Buchanan, on July 25th, answered Mr. 
Sazonof's urging tbat England make clear that it stood with France 
and Russia: 

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and 
Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of modera- 
tion were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than 
if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. 

Such a mediator can certainly not be called an "honest broker." 
In addition to the fact that Sir Edward Grey, on account of 
his entente position toward France and also toward Russia, had 
not the impartiality and inner freedom which alone could have 
qualified him for the role he desired of mediator and judge in the 
Serbian dispute — a role which he had already played in other dis- 
putes — he was, granting the sincerity of his peaceful inclinations, 
in a difficult position toward his colleagues in the Cabinet, whose 
attitude toward the question of peace or war was not unanimous, 
as was proved later to the entire world by the retirement of the 
three friends of peace. 

At first Sir Edward made some resistance to the urging of 
Eussia and France for an immediate declaration of solidarity. He 
thoroughly approved of the explanations given on July 24 by 
Buchanan to Sazonof, of which the most important was the one to 
the efl'ect that England could scarcely agree to being unconditionally 
bound to give France and Russia anned support, because public 
opinion in England would not sanction a war on account of Serbia 
("Blue Book," No. 6.) In fact, he expressly states: 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanc- 
tion our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. ("Blue Book," No. 24.) 



28 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

England's position had a most disagreeable effect in St. Peters- 
burg and Paris, as was shown, not in the documents made public 
at that time, but in the statements of the press. 

Kussian and French diplomacy sought to influence Sir Edward 
Grey by the assertion that the peril lay in the fact that the German 
Government might consider it a foregone conclusion that England 
would not intervene ; that, as soon as England should determinedly 
support Russia and France, Germany would bring pressure to bear 
on Austria-Hungary, and, in this way, the danger of war would 
be averted ("Blue Book," No. 17.) Even as late as July 27 Sir 
G. Buchanan answered Mr. Sazonof on the subject of this ever- 
recurring line of argument, in a thoroughly pertinent manner, by 
saying that he was mistaken if he thought such a course would help 
the cause of peace; that, by such a threat, Germany's attitude would 
merely be stiffened. ("Blue Book," No. 44.) 

While the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg was stating 
only what was self-evident, namely, that an English threat against 
Germany would both fail of its intended effect and make the 
critical situation even worse, London began to yield to the pressure 
of France and Russia. 

First, Sir Edward Grey lent ear to Paul Cambon's plan of a 
conference, expressed in the following form : the British Cabinet 
was to request the German Government "to take the initiative in 
offering at Vienna mediation between Austria and Serbia by the 
four powers not directly interested, ("Yellow Book," No. 33.) 
This project was futile from the very start, since it not only pre- 
supposed Germany's taking an initiative toward her ally which 
France had refused with alarm to take toward Russia, but also 
ignored the fact that Austria-Hungary was known to have taken 
the stand that intervention or mediation of third parties in her 
conflict with Serbia could not be accepted. Austria-Hungary, 
moreover, by accepting the Grey-Cambon proposal, would thereby 
have recognized Russia as a power directly interested in the con- 
flict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which was diametrically 
opposed to Austro-Hungarian conceptions and intentions. Paul 
Cambon, however, by luring Sir Edward Grey onto this thin ice, 
succeeded, in view of the fact that Germany's refusal of the pro- 
posal was beyond doubt, in making the attitude of the English 
Cabinet toward Germany more unfriendly. 

Besides, a certain amount of encouragement to France and 



Germany^s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 29 

Russia emanated from the British Government. What influences 
were at work there is shown by the agreement between two telegrams 
("Yellow Book," Nos. 63 and 66) which the French Charge d' Af- 
faires in London sent to his Government on July 27th. 

No. 63. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors give it to be 
understood that they are certain that England will observe neutrality 
if a conflict break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that Prince Lich- 
nowsky, however, after the conversation he had with him today, could 
not preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the 
British Government intends to keep, should it deem intervention 
necessary. ^ 

The German Ambassador cannot have failed to be struck by this 
declaration, but, so as to bring pressure upon Germany, and so as to 
avoid a conflict, it appears indispensable that Germany should be led 
to hold it for certain that she would find England and Eussia by the 
side of France. 

No. 66. 

London, July 27, 1914. 
Sir Edward Grey this morning told the German Ambassador that if 
Austria invaded Serbia after the Serbian reply, she would prove that 
she was not merely seeking a settlement of the questions mentioned 
in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small State. 
"Then," he added, "a European question would be raised and a war 
would ensue in which all the powers would take part." The attitude 
of Great Britain is defined by the stoppage of the demobilization of 
her fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty on Friday already discreetly 
took this step on his own initiative. Tonight Sir Edward Grey and 
his colleagues decided to publish this news. This result is due to the 
conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Eussia. 

Attention is called to the nuances in the statements of Grey 
and ISTicolson to the French Charge d' Affaires : Nicolson claims to 
have given the German Ambassador explanations which should have 
left no doubt in the latter's mind that England reserved her free- 
dom to interfere. Grey claims only to have spoken ''other powers" 
might also take part in a war. (Note 4.) 



[Note 4. — The French Government had an English translation made 
of its "Yellow Book" by The London Times and declared explicitly 
on the title page that this translation was "authorized." In this 
translation the following: 

"une guerre a laquelle d'autes Puissances seraient amenees a prendre 
part," 



30 Germnnjf s Case in the Supreme Conrt of Civilization 

But of more importance than this difference hot ween the more 
emphatic tone of Nicolson, known as one of tlie fathers of the 
Eussiau-English rapprochement, and the mikler tone of Grey, is 
the fact that the First Lord of the Admiralty, on his own initiative, 
and early as July 24, postponed the dispersal of the fleet which had 
been gathered for maneuvers; and still more important is the fact 
that, on July 27, Sir Edward Grey felt called upon to announce 
this measure, kept secret up to then, to the French Charge d'Af- 
faires, as a consequence of the good relations between Eussia and 
Serbia. Grey also informed the Kussian Ambassador of this on the 
same day, and communicated the following on the subject to 
Buchanan : 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and 
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand 
aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression 
must produce. This impression ought, as T have pointed out, to be 
dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is 
concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver 
leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference 
to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic 
action was promised. ("Blue Book," No. 47.) 

One can imagine what inferences the Russian and French 
Governments drew from the continued state of mol)ilization of the 
English North Sea fleet, and from the announcement of this 
measure, despite the reservation with which Sir Edward Grey 
deemed it best to impart the information. The action of the First 
Lord of the Admiralty and the sanctioning and announcement of 
that action by the British Cabinet carried more weight than all 
cautious statements. 

During the following two days the war party in the English 
Cabinet must have won the upper hand even more; for, on July 



is translated: 

"a war in which all the powers would take part"; 

Thus, the original French version, "a war in which other powers 
might be led to take part," 

was translated, with the authorization of the French Government, 
into: 

"a war in which all powers would take part." 

By this retouching, and for obvious reasons, a clearness of speech 
is attributed to Sir Edward Grey on July 27 which in reality he did 
not find until later.] 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Ciznlization 31 

29, Sir Edward Grey took a step which could leave no doubt as to 
England's being on the side of her associates in the Entente. On 
that day Grey had a conference with Prince Lichnowsky concerning 
which he himself informed the English Ambassador at Berlin 
("Blue Book," No. 89) : 

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the 
European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a qv^ite 
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situa- 
tion was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present 
actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Ger- 
many became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so 
great that it would involve European interests; and I did not wish him 
to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped 
would continue — in thinking that we should stand aside. 

This announcement left nothing to 1)e desired so far as clear- 
ness was concerned. 

Now clearness in difficult situations may be an advantage and 
lead. to disentanglement. But if that was the object of Sir Edward 
Grey, what evil spirit prompted him to say to the French Ambas- 
sador on the morning of July 29 that he would summon the 
German Ambassador and make this "quite private and friendly" 
announcement to him ! 

Die Cast for War. 

Sir Edward Grey himself informs the English Ambassador at 
Paris that he had acted thus ("Blue Book," No. 29) : 

After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to 
be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that 
he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into 
any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts 
to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with 
Germany, failed. 

With that France must have felt sure that she could count on 
the armed support of England, in case she might in any way be 
drawn into the conflict. One seeks in vain in the French "Yellow 
Book" for a dispatch from Paul Cambon concerning this most im- 
portant negotiation during the entire critical week; one also seeks 
there in vain for the instructions concerning it given in Paris to 
St. Petersburg. But the bullet shot from London on July 29 
appears on the evening of the same day in St. Petersburg, in the 
telegram wherein Sazonof commissions Isvolsky to express to the 



32 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Cirdlization 

French Government the sincere gratitude of the Eussian Govern- 
ment for the declaration of unconditional armed support. 
("Orange Book/' No. 58.) 

Now the die had been cast for war. As early as July 25 
Sazonof had declared to the English Ambassador: "If Russia 
feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of 
war," ("Blue Book," No. 17.) Matters then had come to this 
pass, thanks to the certainty, reached at last, that the entry of 
France into the war would cause England to break loose, France 
had promised armed support to Russia, and, in connection there- 
with, doubtless observed that English aid could also be counted 
upon. (Note 5.) 

To his report to Paul Cambon regarding his contemplated 
announcement to Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey added some 
statements which at first sight seem to be somewhat analogous to 
the reservation made by him when he announced to the Russian 
Ambassador the continued state of mobilization of the English 
fleet. He pointed out that public opinion in England looked upon 
the difficulties of that time in a different way from that in which 
they had looked upon the Morocco crisis. Then it had seemed as 
if Germany wished to crush France on account of a question which 
was the substance of a special agreement between England and 
France. Biit now the question dealt primarily with a question be- 
tween Serbia and Austria-Hungary, perhaps also with one between 
Russia and Germany, and England felt no call to interfere. And 
even if France were drawn in on account of her duties as an ally, 
England had not as yet decided what was to be done; the matter 
was one that must be reflected upon; England was untrammeled 
by obligations and must decide what was to the advantage of British 
interests; that he had felt it necessary to say this in order not to 
let Cambon harbor the belief that a decision had been arrived at 
regarding this point. 



[Note 5. — A report captured in Germany after the outbreak of war 
from the Belgian Charge d 'Affaires at St. Petersburg, M. de rEscaille, 
dated July 30, contains full confirmation of this interconnection. This 
report reads: "England first gave to understand that she would not 
allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir G. Buchanan said this 
openly. Today (on July 30) St. Petersburg is firmly convinced, and 
has even received assurances thereof, that England will line up with 
France. This help is of decisive importance and has contributed 
materially to the triumph of the war party."] 



Germa'mfs Case in the Swprerru Court of Civilization 33 

How Cambon took this is shown by his answer. Sir Edward 
Grey himself wires concerning this to the British Ambassador at 
Paris, ("Blue Book/' No. 87) : 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. 
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for 
supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to 
intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France 
become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of 
Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. 

In fact M. Cambon fully understood Sir Edward Grey, even 
regarding that which he did not state, viz. : the English Cabinet, 
in view of public opinion, needs another reason for interference 
beside a Serbian- Austro-Hungarian or Kussian- German conflict; 
such reason can and must be provided. At all events England 
looks upon a conflict in which Germany and France are also arrayed 
against each other as a question involving the hegemony of Europe, 
in which the decisions still to be made by the English Government 
become clear. 

The intelligent M. Cambon did not delay then, after assurances 
of French armed support to Russia had been given as a result of 
this interview with Sir Edward Grey, in seeking other issues for 
the spreading conflagration. On the next day, July 30, he pre- 
sented to Sir Edward Grey the correspondence of November, 1913, 
accompanied by a notice of the Paris Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regarding alleged German preparations for war on the German- 
French frontier, (Note 6) and with his characteristic penetration 
he foresaw that Germany would now attack France, either by de- 
manding the cessation of French preparations for war, or by de- 
manding a declaration of neutrality from France in the event of a 
German-Eussian war. France would have to reject both of these. 
("Blue Book," No. 105.) 

Criticises Sir Edward Grey. 

Thus a threatening attack on France and an imperiling of 
European peace, the two assumed situations in which, should they 



[Note 6. — This notice, in the form in which it has been made public 
in the English "Blue Book," must have been fabricated subsequently, 
for the reasons stated hereinbefore in Note 1.] 



34 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Ciznlization 

occur, England and Franco had agreed to decide wliellier or not 
they should act jointly with land and sea forces, had indeed arisen, 
according to the view of the French Government. After the inter- 
view on July 29 between Grey and Cambon the decision of the 
English Cabinet could no longer be in doubt. 

Did Sir Edward Grey know that on July 29 the French Govern- 
ment offered Eussia her unconditional support, with which Russia 
was resolved to run all the risks of a war? If so, had he any 
thought of succeeding when, on July 30, he telegraphed to 
Buchanan that he urgently recommend to the Russian Govern- 
ment the project for mediation emanating from the interview with 
the German Ambassador? If Sir Edward Grey was in earnest 
here in his attempt to reach an understanding at the last moment 
on this basis, and if he really sincerely welcomed the admission 
secured from Count Berchtold through the intervention of the 
German Emperor that he would discuss with Russia the ultima- 
tum to Serbia, what feelings must have been aroused in him by 
the fact that the Russian Government, in spite of the possibilities 
of peace yet existing and of his own urging, ordered general mobili- 
zation on July 31, thus making inevitable a war to which, in accord- 
ance with all that had gone before, England must also be a party? 

If the sudden and unprecedented!}^ grave step by Russia aroused 
any feelings at all in Sir Edward Grey, one must acknowledge that 
he was able to master them. At all events there is no trace of any 
such feelings in the "Blue Book," nor any trace of remonstrance 
against Russia's step which spoiled everything, nor of any endeavor 
to plead with Russia that she cease the mobilization which had 
been ordered or make satisfactory explanations to Germany. 

On the contrary Grey made the attempt, hopeless from the start, 
of continuing the negotiations and keeping mobilized Germany 
quiet. This last was refused by Germany. Secretary- of State von 
Jagow declared to Sir E. Goschen that Russia said that her 
mobilization, did not necessarily mean war, since Russia could well 
remain some months in a state of mobilization without waging war, 
but that this was not the case with Germany, that Germany's ad- 
vantage was speed, Russia's numbers, and the security of Germany 
forbade her to allow Russia to collect her masses of troops from all 
parts of her great Empire ("Blue Book," No. 138.) 

Moreover, now that the die had been cast, Sir Edward Grey 
concentrated his endeavors upon playing his cards in such a way 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 35 

that an occasion should Ije provided for the immediate entry of 
England into the war, which should appear conclusive to the still 
reluctant part of the English Cahinet and of English public 
opinion. 

The "Blue" and "Yellow"" books together show that Grey, who 
had been as closely bound morally as it is possible to be to Paul 
Cambon since the 29th of July, found some difficulty in persuading 
the English Cabinet that the mere entry of F'rance into the war 
was sufficient reason for the active participation of England. It was 
clear that there was not sufficient support in the English Cabinet 
for Cambon's view that a war in which France and Germany were 
involved meant a fight for the hegemony of Europe to wdiich Eng- 
land could not remain indifEerent — a view to which Grey had not 
demurred (see above.) 

The embarrassment of Grey was increased by very far-reaching 
assurances which Germany held out for the event of a declaration 
of neutrality by England. On July 29, when the "friendly and 
private" statements of Grey to Prince Lichnowsky were as yet un- 
known in Berlin, the Imperial Chancellor made a proposal to Sir 
E. Goschen which was calculated to make British neutrality possible. 
("Blue Book," No. 85.) The Chancellor pointed out that a Kussian 
attack on Austria-Hungary would probably lead to a European 
conflagration, since Germany was bound to give armed support to 
her ally. The Chancellor added that it was clear to him that 
England would not view with indifference any possible conflict 
in which France was to be destroyed, but that the destruction of 
France was not Germany's aim, and, provided that English neu- 
trality were assured, all possible assurances could be given the 
British Government that Germany contemplated absolutely no ter- 
ritorial increase at the expense of France, even if Germany emerged 
victorious from such a war. The Chancellor refused, after a request 
by Goschen, to make a like assurance regarding the French colonies, 
a refusal which later was not maintained. The Chancellor declared 
further that Germany would respect the neutrality of Holland so 
long as it should be respected by others, and, as for Belgium, what- 
ever operations Germany might be obliged to undertake there would 
depend on how France acted, but that, after the war, Belgium's 
integrity would be respected, provided that Belgium had not taken 
up arms against Germany. 

This offer was most peremptorily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, 



36 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

("Blue Book," No. 101.) Goschen was instrucled to inform the 
Chancellor respecting the assurances regarding France : 

It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany 
at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
country would never recover. 

He added that it was likewise out of the question that England 
should bargain regarding her duties and interests in connection 
with Belgian neutrality. 

The vehemence of expression in the refusal of the German pro- 
posal is significant: Sir Edward Grey looked upon himself as an 
ally of France who was to be tempted to break faith. But he was 
determined to make of Belgian neutrality the issue which he needed 
in order to bring the Cabinet and public opinion into the war. 

No. 113 of the "Blue Book" contains the telegram from St. 
Petersburg concerning the order for general mobilization of 
Russia's forces. 

No. 114 of the "Blue Book" contains a telegram of Sir Edward 
Grey to the Ambassadors at Berlin and Paris, reading as follows: 

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of pros- 
pect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's 
Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger- 
man) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Bel- 
gium so long as no other power violates it. 

Thus Grey's answer to the Eussian mobilization was not a step 
in St. Petersburg but the raising of the question of Belgian neu- 
trality in Berlin — in Paris the question was self-evidently a farce — 
in order to create the pretext for England's intervention. 

In fact, it was high time for something to happen in this direc- 
tion, for the French Ambassador, who had acted immediately upon 
the fateful statement of Grey on July 29, and irrevocably committed 
France, and wlio liad presented the correspondence of November, 
1912, to Sir Edward Grey on July 30, and asked for its acceptance, 
became impatient when Sir Edward, forced by a Cabinet decision, 
made excuses. Grey telegraphed on July 31 to the English Am- 
bassador in Paris ("Blue Book," No. 114) that Paul Cambon had 
shown a telegram of Jules Cambon from Berlin — evidently a put-up 
job — according to which Germany had been encouraged by the 



Ger7na/ny*s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 37 

uncertainty as to England's intervention. Sir Edward protested 
and told Paul Carabon that lie had, on that same morning, definitely 
refused in the presence of the German Ambassador to make any 
declarations of neutrality and had even stated that, if Germany 
and France became involved in a war, England would be drawn 
into it; but that this, however, was not to be construed as meaning 
an agreement with France, He told Paul Cambon further that the 
Cabinet had decided that it could not bind itself in any way at that 
moment. "Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public 
opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country 
were involved." But, he added significantly, further events might 
change the situation and convince Government and Parliament that 
intervention was justified. Belgium's neutrality might be, in de- 
termining England's attitude, "I would not say a decisive, but an 
important factor." 

On the Eve of War. 

How little Paul Cambon was satisfied with this answer is shown 
by his own report on the interview, ("Yellow Book," ISTo. 110.) He 
asked Grey whether England would wait before intervening until 
Germany attacked France. 

I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our 
frontier by Germany revealed intentions of approaching aggression, 
and that if Europe's mistake in 1870 were to be avoided, it behooved 
England to consider from this moment under what conditions she would 
give us the help on which France counted. 

But Grey stuck to the Cabinet decision. On the other hand, 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, whom Cambon met when he left the office 
of the Secretary of State, gave this much consolation: that the 
Council of Ministers would meet again next day, "and confidentially 
he gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs would not fail to reopen the discussion." 

It is hardly necessary here to read between the lines. 

Before the meeting of the Council of Ministers announced for 
the next day by Nicolson, answers arrived from Paris and Berlin 
to Grey's question as to Belgian neutrality. Naturally, the French 
Government emphatically promised to respect Belgian neutrality. 
In Berlin, on the other hand, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs stated to the English Ambassador that he must first consult 
the Emperor and Chancellor. 



38 Germany' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might 
give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign 
in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful 
whether they return any answer at all. ("Blue Book," No. 122.) 

This dispatch of Goschcn left Berlin late on the evening of 
July 31, and, according to a note in the English "Blue Book," was 
received at the Foreign Office on Aug. 1. 

The English echo followed promptly. The very next number in 
the "Blue Book" (123) contains a telegram from Grey to Goschcn 
dated Aug. 1, according to which Sir Edward told Prince Lich- 
nowsky that the answer of the Gcrnum Government regarding 
Belgian neutrality was for him a matter of very great regret, since 
the neutrality of Belgium affected the feeling in England. If 
Germany could answer as France had done, this would contriljute 
materially to lessening the anxiety and tension in England. On the 
other hand, if one belligerent should violate the neutrality of 
Belgium, while the other respected it, it would be extremely diffi- 
cult to control public opinion in England. Prince Lichnowsky 
inquired in his turn whether, in case Germany bound herself to 
respect Belgian neutrality, England would bind herself to remain 
neutral. Grey evaded this, maintained that the hands of the Eng- 
lish Government were still free, and that it was about to consider 
what it was going to do. He said that all he could say was that 
its attitude would be determined largely by public opinion, which 
deemed Belgian neutrality of great importance, but that he believed 
that England could not promise to preserve neutrality solely on this 
condition. Then, Prince Lichnowsky urgently inquired whether 
Grey would not state the conditions under which England would 
remain neutral, "He even suggested that the integrity of France 
and her colonies might be guaranteed." But to this Grey replied : 
"1 felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on 
similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands 
free." Thus reads Sir Edward Grey's own report on this interview 
held on the morning of Aug. 1. 

Germany went even further in the concession by which she 
wished to make English neutrality possible. On Aug. 4, 1914, the 
Imperial Chancellor announced in the Eeichstag that he had offered 
to the English Government "that, so long as England remained 
neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France" ; he 
added "that, so long as England remained neutral, we also were 



Germany' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 39 

ready, provided reciprocal measures were taken, not to engage in 
any hostile operations against the French merchant marine." 

The English "Blue Book" makes no mention of these conces- 
sions. The question arises as to whether this concession was ever 
brought to the knowledge of the English Cabinet by Sir Edward 
Grey. That the omission cannot be laid at the door of the German 
Ambassador in London is shown by the French "Yellow Book" 
(No. 144,) wherein Paul Cambon reports under date of Aug. 3 
that the German Ambassador had made a communication to the 
press stating that, if England remained neutral, Germany would 
forego all naval demonstrations and not use the Belgian coast as a 
point of support. 

Thus Germany offered, in exchange for the neutrality of Eng- 
land, to respect the integrity of Belgium, and of France and her 
colonies, and also to forego all naval operations against the French 
coast and the French merchant marine, but English neutrality was 
not to be obtained at that or any other price, as Sir Edward clearly 
stated. "England wishes to keep her hands free," was the transla- 
tion from the language of cant into that of sincerity of : "England 
is already bound to France." 

On the day of the formal and categorical refusal to remain 
neutral under any conditions (Aug. 1,) Sir Edward Grey made the 
following announcement to Paul Cambon : 

That he would inform the Cabinet of the unsatisfactory answer 
of Germany regarding Belgian neutrality and request to be em- 
powered to say on Monday (Aug. 3) in the House of Commons 
that the British Government would not tolerate a violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality. That, moreover, the British squadrons were 
mobilized, and he wished to suggest to his colleagues a declaration 
to the effect that the British fleet would prevent the German fleet 
from passing through the Channel, or — should they pass through — 
from making any sort of demonstration on the French coast. 

It cannot be assumed that it is customary in England for the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to impart beforehand to the 
representative of an interested foreign power matters of world- 
historical scope which he contemplates bringing up in the Cabinet 
council, and in this way to commit his country to a policy before 
the Cabinet has spoken. Such procedure is all the more remarkable 
when it has to do with decisions against which successful resistance 
had already been made by members of the Cabinet. If, notwith- 



4)0 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

standing, Sir Edward Grey imparted this information on the morn- 
ing of Aug. 1, thus forestalling the Cabinet, he at least could 
excuse himself by saying that he thereby bound himself no more 
deeply to France than he had already done. 

At any rate, it is significant that the English "Blue Book" has 
no report from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at 
Paris on this interview with Paul Cambon, whereas Paul Cambon 
did not fail to report on it at once to his Government. 

England and Belgium. 

Paris had become so alarmed on account of the opposition in the 
English Cabinet that the English Ambassador there telegraphed to 
London on the evening of July 31 that the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was 

urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the 
circumstances and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's 
Government at the earliest moment possible. ("Blue Book," No. 124.) 

The answer was the unusual announcement of Sir Edward Grey 
to Paul Cambon on the morning of Aug. 1. 

Now France was quieted and, without awaiting German mobili- 
zation, the French Government ordered, on Aug. 1 at 3 :40 P.M., 
the general mobilization of the French Army. ("Blue Book," No. 
136.) 

On the next day, Sunday, Aug. 2, Sir Edward Grey made an 
announcement to the French Ambassador, which he repeated on 
Aug. 3, in the following more precise form: 

In case the German fleet passes through the Channel or traverses 
the North Sea for the purpose of rounding the British Isles in order 
to attack the French coasts or the French Navy, and to alarm the 
French merchant marine, the English fleet would intervene and lend 
the French Navy its full protection, so that from that moment England 
and Germany would be at war. ("Yellow Book," No. 143.) 

When he first made this statement Sir Edward Grey felt bound 
to add this explanation: The English Government was obliged to 
take into consideration far-reaching questions and difficult issues 
and felt that it could not bind itself necessarily to declare war on 
Germany, in case war should break out between France and 
Germany, but that it was important for the French Government, 



Germanif 8 Case in tlw Supreme Court of Ckilization 41 

whose fleet had been concentrated for a long time in the Mediter- 
ranean, to know what steps it was to take for the protection of its 
entirely unprotected northern coast. For this reason the English 
Government had considered itself bound to make the announce- 
ment mentioned. This did not bind England to enter into the 
war against Germany, unless the German fleet acted in the manner 
described in the declaration. 

This comment shows to what a degree the agreements between 
France and England, though not formally binding, really consti- 
tuted actual obligations. Merely on the basis of the plans of opera- 
tions agreed upon between the French and English military and 
naval authorities which, in case of war, were not to impair the 
freedom of action of the two Governments, the French fleet had 
been concentrated in the Mediterranean. And now the British 
Cabinet felt itself obliged by this concentration to take over the 
protection of the French northern coast and merchant marine, and, 
on account of this, to enter possibly into a state of war with 
Germany. 

Therefore, if during the time between Aug. 2 and 4 German 
warships had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, 
a state of war would immediately have arisen between Germany 
and England, since such an operation would have been immediately 
taken by the English to mean that the French coast or fleet was to 
be attacked or, at least, the French merchant marine to be alarmed ; 
and this would have occurred solely because of the obligations which 
the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by the entente with 
France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing; all this, 
moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian 
neutrality. 

But Belgian neutrality remained as a possible reason for war, 
which the majority of the English Cabinet felt must be entered 
upon, but for which an excuse must now be constructed and held 
in reserve. To be sure. Grey spoke to Cambon on Aug. 3 only 
about the sailing of the German fleet as a casus belli, whereas he 
did not even mention Belgian neutrality. On the other hand, he 
had expressed himself in the interview of Aug. 2 to the effect that 
the Cabinet was still considering what it was to say next day in 
Parliament, and whether it was to declare the violation of Belgian 
neutrality a casus belli. ("Blue Book." No. 148.) Thus Grey had 
not yet put through in the Cabinet his proposal, announced to the 



42 Gcrmnny'ii Case in the Supreme Court of Ciiilization 

French Ambassador on Aug. 31, that England was not to tolerate 
the violation of Belgian neutrality. 

One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did 
not come out and cause hostile action on the part of the English 
fleet. Then the fairy tale that England was forced to enter the war 
solely by the violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of Germany 
could never have come up. 

As matters developed, the second pretext for war, held ready by 
the leaders of English policy, became acute. The German Govern- 
ment found itself obliged, on account of the state of affairs which is 
already but too well knoAvn, to ask from Belgium permission for 
German troops to march through its territory. The King of the 
Belgians asked the King of England for diplomatic support for the 
protection of Belgian integrity. Thereupon the English Govern- 
ment demanded from the German Government an immediate decla- 
ration as to the respecting of Belgian neutrality. ("Blue Book," 
Xo. 156.) The German Ambassador made a final attempt by im- 
parting to the English Government the text of a telegram from the 
Foreign Department asking him to reiterate most emphatically that, 
even in the event of armed conflict. Germany would under no cir- 
cumstances annex Belgian territory. This telegram continued : 

Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German Army could not 
be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned ac- 
cording to absolutely unimpeachable information, ("Blue Book," No.^ 
157.) 

This final attempt likewise failed. The English Government, 
as late as the evening of Aug. 4, presented an ultimatum to expire- 
at midnight, at a time when German troo])s had already crossed 
the Belgian frontier. The war with England had begun ! 

That England Avould have entered the war even if Germany 
had not in any Avay violated the neutrality of Belgium needs no 
further proof after the development shown above of the French- 
English-German negotiations during the critical week. TJie re- 
sponsible directors of the British policy had so sirongly committed 
England to an immediate armed intervention on the side of France 
during the days that elapsed after the handing of the Austro-Hun- 
garian note to Serbia, and done so entirely on the basis of the 
entente with France which did not bind them formally to anything, 
that war could have been prevented only at the price of the fall of 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 43 

the Britisli CaUnet, and of the reproach to Englarid of having acted 
perfidious] ij. 

That those who had brought England to this pass profited by 
working to the utmost 'the pretext of the violation of Belgian neu- 
trality— wliich. as they admitted, they expected to influence public 
opinion strongly— in order to hide their responsibility is another 
matter. How insincere this pretext was has often enough been 
pointed out. In this connection attention may be called to the doc- 
uments, captured in Brussels by German officials, which showed the 
existence of an agreement between English and Belgian military 
authorities similar in every way to the French-English agreement 
regarding Joint action by the two general military and naval staffs. 
If, with regard to the English-Belgian military understanding, 
England maintains that the measures taken dealt exclusively with 
the possibility of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, and 
that they were not in themselves binding in any way on the policy 
of the two Governments, this pretext is worth exactly as much as 
the similar one continually brought forward during a decade by 
English statesmen in Parliament and before public opinion regard- 
ing the character of the French-English entente. But in the case 
of Belgium the relationship is made particularly clear. Among the 
captured documents there is a record in the handwriting of Count 
von der Straaten, Director in the Belgian Foreign Office, of a con- 
ference between the English military attache in Brussels, Lieut. 
Col. Bridges, and the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General 
Jungbluth, on April 3, 1912. In this conference, according to the 
record of Count von der Straaten, Lieut. Col. Bridges stated : 

The English Government during the recent events (Morocco crisis) 
■would immediately have undertaken a landing in our country (Belgium), 
even if we had not asked for help. 

The General objected, the record continues, that for this our 
consent was necessary. 

The Military Attache answered that he was aware of this ; but, 
as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from marching 
through our country, England would have landed her troops in 
Belgium anyhow. 

There is nothing in Count von der Straaten's record to show 
that Belgium made any objection or reservation regarding this. 

Thus England, in 1912, had decided to throw overboard Belgian 



44 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

neutrality on account of which she ostensibly has gone to war, with- 
out the quiver of an eyelash. Belgium herself had most seriously 
compromised her neutrality by her military agreements with Eng- 
land. If England, despite this, wishes to make the world believe 
that she drew her sword to protect Belgium's neutrality, then she 
is playing the role of a seducer seeking to protect the innocence 
which he himself has seduced. 

The document published by the Governments of the Triple 
Entente, then, provide the following outlines for a history of the 
beginnings of the European war : 

1. Eussia caused the war by the general mobilization ordered 
by her on July 31, which, as the Eussian statesmen knew perfectly 
well, made war inevitable for Germany. 

2. All the pretexts adduced by the Eussian Government for 
the mobilization are weak. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor German 
military measures can be advanced as reasons for the general Eus- 
sian mobilization. Instead, the Eussian Government gave the order 
for general mobilization immediately after Austria-Hungary, 
through the efforts of the German Emperor at Vienna, had decided 
upon a decisively amenable attitude on the Serbian conflict, and 
had made known this resolve to the Eussian Ambassador at Vienna. 
Thus Eussia brought on war by her general mobilization at a 
moment when the hope of preserving peace had been resuscitated 
by a conciliatory step on the part of Austria-Hungary. 

3. Eussia, by her own statement, was resolved from the begin- 
ning of the crisis to face all risks of a war provided she were sure 
of help from France. The promise of unconditional armed support 
from France was received by Eussia on the evening of July 29, 
coupled in all probability with the announcement that France would 
have England on her side. 

4. France gave her promise of unconditional armed support of 
Eussia only when the French Government ponsidered itself assured 
of the cooperation of England. The French Government received 
the assurance of armed support from England through the an- 
nouncement which the English Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs made on the morning of July 29 to the French Ambassa- 
dor regarding the defiant statement which he intended to make to 
the German Ambassador. 

5. Those responsible for England's policy were closely l)ound 
from the start by the entente with France, and made up their minds 



Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 45 

during the critical week, if nof before, to take part in the war if 
France should become involved. 

6. Those responsible for England's policy were moreover very 
rightly of the opinion that a war on account of the Serbian ques- 
tion Avould not meet with public approval. For this reason they 
bent their efforts to find a pretext for war which would meet with 
English public approval. This was provided by the violation of 
Belgian neutrality, which had been jeopardized years before by 
Belgium, and which was not to be respected should emergency arise 
by the English General Staff, according to the statements of the 
English Military Attache in Brussels. 

8. That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany 
was merely a pretext for the English Cabinet, is shown by the fact 
that, before the sending of the English ultimatum to Germany 
regarding Belgiimi, the English Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs had formally declared to the French Ambassador that Eng- 
land would consider passage through the Channel or the North Sea 
by the German fleet as a casus belli. 

Triple Entente Held Responsible. 

On account of these indisputable interrelated facts, confirmed hy 
the official utterances of the Governments of the Triple Entente, 
the contention that Germany desired and caused the war will be 
adjudged Avorthless before the Court of History. Eussia is adjudged 
the incendiary, France and England the fellow-criminals. 

It does not lie within the score of this recital to delve into the 
depths of the fateful concatenation of isolated happenings and 
negotiations between July 24 and Aug. 4 which caused the greatest 
and bloodiest of wars. Let it suffice to point out that these isolated 
happenings and negotiations — the words of a Grey, a Cambon, a 
Sazonof, the negotiations of the First Lord of the British 
Admiralty and the Eussian Commander in Chief, which in them- 
selves appear insignificant before the great tragedy of humanity — 
are merely manifestations rising to the surface at the decisive 
moment of the forces whose rule makes up the world history of our 
time. These are : 

In Eussia, the ambition to dominate in the Near East, doubly 
strong since the defeat suffered in the war against Japan, and de- 
termined, when there is prospect of success, to break down by force 
any resistance from the Central European Powers. 



46 Germany s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 

In France, the fateful direction of the entire national policy 
toward the negative goal of irreconcilable thirst for revenge, which, 
allied with fear, culminates in the continual readiness to attack us 
in conjunction with every strong foe of Germany. 

In England, commercial envy against ever}' rising regime, 
coupled with instinctive hostility toward the strongest Continental 
])0wer and the tradition that every Continental ambition for sea 
power must be forcibly crushed. 

These heterogeneous forces spun the net of the Entente, which 
became the frightful tool of tlie small minority ardently desiring 
war, and in which the great peaceful majority of the Russian, 
French, and English nations became hopelessly entangled. Russia's 
attitude toward Austria-Hungary in the Serbian question placed 
the burden of decision on the Entente. There can be no doubt that 
one word of refusal from France would have sufficed to hold back 
the Russian war party. It is at least very probable that a word of 
refusal from England Avould have held France back. It is abso- 
lutely certain that every word of encouragement from England 
must necessarily give the upper hand to the war parties in France 
and Russia. On the other hand, it is equally true that, had France 
and England stood aloof, no matter how such a step may have 
been formally authorized by treaties and agreements, the triple 
understanding would have been destroyed, and a new direction 
given to the policy of all Europe, which necessarily would have led, 
not to the hegemony of a single nation, but far more to a state of 
affairs in which ever}^ power could have had its due. 

Confronted with the choice of preserving the entente or preserv- 
ing the peace of the world, the statesmen at the helm in Great 
Britain and France, who had by their own acts and words in reality 
lost their freedom and become entangled, sacrificed the peace of 
the world to the Entente, under pressure from the cliques desiring 
war, and swept in their wake by far the greater part of the public 
in their countries by appealing to the sanctity of written and un- 
written treaties. 

To make clear the details of this complex web of guilt and fate 
will some clay be the great task of the historians of our time. 






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